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THE REAL ETIIlC OF DEATH AND DYING
Norman L. Cantor*
RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH. By Peter Singer. New York: St.
Martin's Press. 1994. Pp. 256. $22.95.

When medical science became capable of prolonging the dying
process beyond the point that most patients would wish, medical
management of the dying process became a necessity. Health-care
providers no longer could strive inexorably to extend waning
human lives. The search thus began for an ethic to govern medical
management of the dying process.1
Peter Singer's Rethinking Life and Death, 2 a provocative and
entertaining book, purports both to critique "the old ethic" - the
book is subtitled "The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics" - and
to propound a "new ethic" to regulate the medical handling of dying patients.3 Although the book does underscore some anomalies
in end-of-life care, its account of the dominant ethic of death and
dying proves inaccurate. Rather than portraying the existing order
- or disorder - it creates a straw man. Moreover, despite the
highly problematic nature of his "new ethic," Singer defends it only
superficially.
This review essay contains three parts. The first exposes the deficiencies in Singer's depiction of the old ethic. The second lays
bare the key ingredients in his new ethic and discusses some of its
major issues and weaknesses. The third presents my own prescription for an appropriate ethic to govern medical management of the
dying process.
* Professor of Law and Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers University School of
Law. A.B. 1964, Princeton; J.D. 1967, Columbia. - Ed.
1. For description of diverse ethical theories suggested for the field of bioethics in general, and the death-and-dying context in particular, see ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 44-111 (4th ed. 1994); THOMAS A. MAPPES
& DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 4-46 (4th ed. 1996); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting
Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED.
395 (1994).
2. Peter Singer is a philosophy professor at Monash University in Australia and has written extensively on animal rights and on bioethics topics such as reproductive technology and
care of the dying.
3. The book touches on an ethic toward fetal life and animal life as well as dying medical
patients. Its focus, however, rests on the medical handling of human life. This essay centers
on that feature.
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THE OLD ETHIC AS STRAW MAN

According to Singer, a "sanctity of life" ethic dominates the
traditional approach to death and dying. A central premise of that
supposed ethic is that all human beings, no matter how rudimentary
their mental function and capacity, deserve protection. That protection includes a prohibition against the intentional taking of innocent human life and, in the medical context, a ban on letting
patients die4 simply because of deteriorated quality of life (pp. 7375). Exceptions to this sanctity-of-life approach supposedly exist to
allow for the cessation of "extraordinary means of medical treatment" and for the use of analgesics that are intended to relieve pain
but incidentally hasten death (p. 147). However, the strict sanctityof-life ethic described by Singer has not prevailed in AngloAmerican jurisprudence since 1976, when the New Jersey Supreme
Court in In re Quinlan5 upheld the discontinuation of life support
maintaining a permanently unconscious patient.
Singer contends that physicians who remove life-sustaining machinery with the object of allowing a patient to die take an innocent
human life - a violation of what he sees as the old sanctity-of-life
principle. In Singer's view, the medical profession secured authorization to take such steps in the 1993 Bland6 case, in which Britain's
House of Lords upheld the removal of a feeding tube sustaining a
permanently unconscious patient (pp. 65-66). This assertion ignores the fact that American courts for twenty years have upheld
the right to remove life support, including artificial nutrition, from
permanently unconscious patients even though the acting parties involved understood that death would ensue. Quinlan was the first
such decision,7 but a succession of cases from other jurisdictions
have followed suit.a Singer attempts, unsuccessfully, to distinguish
these American precedents as being grounded in autonomy - the
prior expressions of now incompetent patients (p. 64). Quinlan did
4. Singer contends that the existing whole-brain definition of death has "come apart."

See p. 36. That contention rests principally on the fact that even after brain death - under
current definitions - occurs, certain endocrinal or hormonal functions of the body continue
for some period. See p. 36. Yet Singer does not articulate an alternative definition of death.
Instead, he reformulates the concept of "personhood" and declares that the lives of "nonpersons" merit no legal protection. I critique that reformulation of personhood, a part of
Singer's "new ethic," in Part II.
5. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
6. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 2 W.L.R. 332 (C.A. 1993).
7. Quinlan involved the withdrawal of a respirator, not artificial nutrition, and the patient
surprisingly endured for nine years. Nonetheless, the firm medical expectation had been that
withdrawal of the respirator would cause the prompt death of the patient. See Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647.
8. Justice Stevens's dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
348 n.21 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), contains a list of decisions so holding. For an analysis of the judicial rationales employed in these cases, see Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently
Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1989).
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not rely on the patient's prior expressions.9 Furthermore, subsequent decisions have endorsed the withdrawal of life support from
patients even in the absence of clear-cut prior expressions. 10 In
short, American jurisprudence on death and dying generally accepts that physicians sometimes may "take innocent life," as Singer
defines the concept.
The second aspect of Singer's old sanctity-of-life ethic - the
notion that poor quality of life can never justify the termination of
life-sustaining medical intervention - never really has prevailed.
Since 1976, American courts have recognized that a person's health
may deteriorate to such a degree that she may be better off dead
than alive. 11 Cases have applied this principle to both competent
and incompetent patients. For incompetent patients, judicial acceptance of end-of-life determinations has relied both on the dismal
status of the patient - such as permanent unconsciousness - and
on determinations that the burdens of existence, such as pain and
suffering, can outweigh the benefits of extended life.12 Contrary to
what Singer suggests, courts frequently consider diminished quality
of life, in the sense of grievous bodily deterioration, in shaping the
bounds of medical intervention in the dying process.13
With regard to the asserted "old ethic," Singer suggests that permitting the removal of "extraordinary means" of life preservation
constitutes the main deviation from a strict sanctity-of-life principle
(p. 188). The concept of extraordinary means, which originated in a
1957 pronouncement of Pope Pius XII, 14 influenced the original position of the devoutly Catholic Quinlan family. 1s In fact, the concept sometimes was cited as a possible demarcation of permissible
medical conduct in ending life-sustaining intervention. For exam9. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
10. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987); In re Drabick, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 855-60 (cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d
716 (Ga. 1984); In re Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d
332 (Minn. 1984); In re Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio P. Ct. 1991); In re L.W. 482 N.W.2d 60,
67 (Wis. 1992).
11. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417; Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445
(Wash. 1987).
12. See, e.g., In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1181-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610
N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. 1993); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985); Grant, 747 P.2d at 45051.
13. In the context of assessing an incompetent patient's best interests, the quality-of-life
consideration sometimes occurs under the heading of "dignity." See Norman L. Cantor,
Quality of Life in Legal Perspective, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1361-66 (Warren T.
Reich et al. eds., 1995).
14. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658.
15. The family petitioned for removal of "all extraordinary means," by which they meant
the patient's respirator, but not her antibiotic therapy or artificial nutrition. See In re
Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806, 813 (N.J. Super. a. Ch. Div. 1975).
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pie, the American Medical Association House of Delegates used
the extraordinary means terminology in 1973 in suggesting guidelines for terminal care.16
Nevertheless, American jurisprudence long since has abandoned the ordinary-extraordinary dichotomy.17 Authorization to
withhold or withdraw life support now extends to the most basic
forms of medical intervention, including blood transfusions,18 artificial nutrition,19 and chemotherapy.20
In sum, the old ethic of death and dying presented by Singer
bears little resemblance to the prevailing ethic found in American
cases of the past twenty years. Had Singer articulated and defended a sensible new direction in the death and dying ethic, that
flaw would seem forgivable - but he did not. Although he does
endorse some unconventional positions, he fails adequately to defend or even to articulate their implications. I tum to consideration
of those positions.
Il.

WEAKNESSES OF THE NEW ETHIC

A. Human Nonpersons

Singer's new ethic centers around the notion that not all human
beings are persons (pp. 180-83). To be a "person," he says, a being
must have an awareness of self over time and enough reasoning
capacity to plan for the future (pp. 182, 218). Under this theory,
certain human beings - including anencephalics, permanently vegetative patients, and neonates - are deemed nonpersons. On the
other hand, certain nonhuman animals - including whales, dolphins, monkeys, dogs, and pigs - are deemed persons (pp. 180-82,
205-06, 209-10). Although Singer does not address it, his framework also might classify some severely retarded or demented
human beings as nonpersons. This might include patients with advanced Alzheimer's, for example.21
Singer's personhood framework falters in its superficial consideration of the implications for human nonpersons. Many commentators have argued that absence of neocortical function - which
includes the capacity to interact with others - ought to form the
16. See James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975).
17. For a clear-cut repudiation of that dichotomy, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 123435 (NJ. 1985); ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHI' TO DIE 481-86 (2d ed. 1995).
18. See In re Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
19. See In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992).
20. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
21. Some of these beings have lost theii- sense of self over time, a factor critical to selfidentity and personhood under Singer's framework.
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boundary of death.22 Singer does not, however, classify his nonpersons as dead. Rather, he sees them as creatures with diminished
rights and expectations, retaining some ,interests but lacking normal
protection against involuntary death (p. 198).
Singer briefly considers the implications of nonpersonhood in
the context of neonates. He supports medical infanticide, at the
parents' discretion, during the first few weeks of a neonate's existence, asserting that these young infants are "not yet full members of
the moral community" (p. 130). In his view, the parents of a
Down's syndrome neonate may withhold her life support if they
prefer to raise only children better equipped to deal with life's challenges (pp. 212-15). Singer does not discuss the concomitant issues
of organ harvesting, medical experimentation, or allocation of
scarce medical resources; however, it seems fair to assume that his
theory would favor the interests of live persons over the interests of
nonperson neonates in prospective life.23
Singer's approach to the implications of nonpersonhood proves
even more perfunctory in the context of permanently unconscious
patients. Must we honor the request of a previously competent patient to be maintained in a permanently vegetative state? Singer
says that such wishes should be "taken into account," but should
not be decisive (p. 192). What about the independent emotional
and financial interests of the patient's relatives and other caretakers? Singer merely says that such interests "deserve consideration"
(p. 192). What about the competing interests of potential organ recipients and potential beneficiaries of nontherapeutic medical experimentation on the permanently unconscious patient? While
Singer comments that we "cannot ignore the needs of others"
(p. 192), he does little to elucidate a hierarchy of interests regarding
the treatment of human nonpersons.
Labelling permanently vegetative patients as nonpersons
achieves very little. If Singer's concern is the indefinite preservation of a dismal quality of life - with no real benefit to the perma22. See John P. Lizza, Persons and Death: What's Metaphysically Wrong With Our Current Statutory Definition of Death?, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 351 (1993); David R. Smith, Legal
Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1986); Robert M. Veatch, The
Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death, HASTINGS CTR. REP. July-Aug.
1993, at 18. No court has ever adopted the neocortical definition of death. See In re Baby K,
16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (entitling an anencephalic infant to
medical treatment); In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (prohibiting organ harvesting
from an anencephalitic infant before death). One major reason to reject a neocortical definition of death is that it would entail affinnative steps to end the life of some spontaneously
breathing human beings. See Raymond J. Devettere, Neocortical Death and Human Death,
18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 96, 102 (1990).
23. See John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 6, 1920 (John Keown ed., 1995). Harris, who subscribes to a definition of personhood identical to
Singer's, argues that the interests of nonpersons must give way to the significant needs of
actual persons.
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nently insensate being and with real opportunity costs to society that concern can be met without denominating the vegetative patient a nonperson. I have argued elsewhere24 that permanently unconscious patients should be allowed to die. My rationale,
however, is not that these patients are nonpersons, but that withdrawal of life support in this circumstance very probably accomplishes the result that the patients would want. The vast majority of
people, when asked, say that they want no life support to maintain
them in a permanently insensate state.25 We ought to respect this
common, and therefore putative, wish in the absence of prior instructions or personal indications to the contrary. Furthermore,
even if the vegetative patient did in fact request life-sustaining
measures, this does not mean necessarily that nonpatient sources
must fund this care.26
Singer might ask in return: What do we gain by calling permanently unconscious beings "persons," especially if we should let
them die anyway? I base my response on a factor that Singer
largely ignores - namely, society's interest in sanctity-of-life, not
as a mandate to prolong every human life, but as an injunction to
respect the interests of human beings and humanlike beings in helpless and vulnerable states. Sanctity-of-life in that sense centers on
the promotion of social sensibility to the interests of humans and of
the moral tone of society.27 From this sanctity-of-life perspective,
human beings ought to be deemed persons with moral status regardless of their intellectual capacities.
At the very least, personhood status should not depend upon
awareness of self over time. A societal interest in moral tone compels a showing of full respect for beings with the capacity to experience human feelings and emotions.ZS Calling such beings persons
does not mean that we must preserve them at all costs or in situations in which their own welfare or putative preferences indicate
that they should be allowed to die.29 Acknowledging personhood
simply implies a respect for the significant interests of such beings,
24. See Cantor, supra note 8, at 410-17.
25. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1993, at 185, 197-99.
26. See Kristi E. Schrode, Comment, Life in Limbo: Revising Policies for Permanently
Unconscious Patients, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1609, 1648-53 (1995).
27. Judicial opinions have recognized that notion of sanctity-of-life. See In re Farrell, 529
A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-24 (N.J. 1985).
28. For views that the capacity for feelings and interactions is sufficient for moral status
as a person, see Daniel Callahan, Terminating Life-Sustaining Treatment of the Demented,
HASTINGS era. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 25; Stephen G. Post, Dementia in Our Midst: The
Moral Community, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 142 (1995).
29. For an elaboration on the appropriate criteria for allowing incompetent patients to
die, see Part III.
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including their autonomous choices, their human dignity,3° and
their presumptive right to continued existence. It reverses Singer's
ostensible indifference toward the lives and interests of those
human beings, including neonates and profoundly incapacitated
adults, who experience pleasure and pain despite their intellectual
deficits. That indifference may stem from Singer's equating the interests of humans and nonhuman animals. In other words, his reluctance to recognize a presumptive right to life for humans with
gravely diminished mental capacity may reflect an unwillingness on
his part to recognize a parallel right for fish and fowl (p. 222).
B. Transition to Active Euthanasia
Singer cannot fathom a regime of medical management of the
dying process that permits the cessation of life-sustaining medical
intervention but forbids the administration of lethal poisons, or active euthanasia. For him, removal of artificial nutrition, or of any
life-sustaining measures, constitutes the intentional taking of
human life (p. 68). He understands that such removal is permissible
in response to the wishes of a competent patient because of the
patient's strong interest in shaping a dignified death and in avoiding
suffering. Singer also understands that those same interests underlie any request for active euthanasia. He therefore sees a "moral
incoherence" in forbidding active administration of death while
permitting removal of life support (p. 80). He sees two medical actions that "are equally certain ways of bringing about the death of
the patient" (p. 221). Indeed, active administration of a poison,
with its immediately fatal result, seems to him more humane than a
withdrawal of care, which creates a more protracted end-of-life
ordeal for both the patient and her family. 31 All this leads Singer to
endorse, as part of his new ethic, physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia when they fulfill a suffering patient's firm wish to
die.
Singer sees it as anomalous to authorize some but not all actions
that precipitate death. He mistakenly believes that the "old ethic"
simply embodies an action-inaction dichotomy. In fact, that old
ethic distinguishes between inaction in the face of a fatal natural
affliction and the introduction of outside agents such as poisons or
bullets that accelerate death. While "pulling the plug" - with30. "Human beings who lack or have lost the capacity for autonomous actions are nonetheless humans who retain their inherent dignity. Respect for persons comprises more than
respect for autonomy." Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting
Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLY. 47, 49 (1994).
31. Singer asks: "How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly,
over a period of weeks from lack of food but unlawful to produce his immediate death by
lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal .•. ?" P. 78.
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drawing life support, such as a respirator - is indeed an action, it
traditionally has been treated, so long as it merely removes a medical obstacle to a natural death, as the moral and practical equivalent
of medical nonintervention.32 When a dying patient objects to further medical intervention, no difference exists between failing to
activate her respirator, failing to replenish her expired oxygen supply, or withdrawing her respirator. All these forms of medical behavior allow a natural dying process to run its course.
From the outset, death-and-dying jurisprudence has regarded
medical withdrawal of life support as equivalent to medical nonintervention.33 It also has distinguished both forms of conduct withholding and withdrawing medical intervention - from the introduction of outside lethal agents. In fact, cases upholding the prerogative of a patient to reject life-sustaining treatment uniformly
have distinguished that behavior froip. suicide on the basis of the
distinction between letting nature take its course and initiating lethal agents.34 Recent cases have maintained that distinction in rejecting dying patients' asserted right to physician-assisted suicide.
The Michigan Supreme Court recently commented:
[W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal
or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to
run its course, unencumbered by contrived intervention . . . . There is
· a difference between choosing a natural death summoned by uninvited illness or calamity, and deliberately seeking to terminate one's
life by resorting to death-inducing measures unrelated to the natural
process of dying.35

The question then becomes whether a meaningful distinction exists
between letting nature take its course and accelerating a natural
dying process. Singer sees the difference as perverse - nonintervention, as opposed to active euthanasia, tends to prolong the dying
process and to increase the burdens on patients and their
caretakers.36
32. See cases cited infra note 34.
33. An important policy concern reinforces the willingness of courts to treat life-support
withdrawal as equivalent to noninitiation. If medical personnel cannot remove life support,
they would be deterred from initiating it when a patient faces a strong chance of a protracted
existence in a dismal, deteriorated state, yet has at least a slight chance of recovery. See
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Assn., Decisions Near the End of
Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2231 (1992) (finding "no ethical distinction between withdrawing and
withholding life-sustaining treatment"); see also Extracts from the Report of the House of
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 96, 105 (John Keown
ed., 1995).
34. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
35. Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728-29 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995). But see Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir.
1996); Quill v. Vacco, 1996 WL 148605 (3d Cir. 1996).
36. Singer also perceives an anomaly in contemporary medical ethics' endorsement of
analgesics that may mitigate a patient's pain but that also may accelerate her death. Again,
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His position deprecates any societal interest in promoting sanctity-of-life in the sense of maintaining respect for human existence
in all its forms. We promote respect for human life by limiting the
circumstances in which we permit humans to terminate human life.
We already tolerate war, capital punishment, and self-defense. Arguably, we should hesitate to add to this list, even for an object as
appealing as the relief of suffering. Some commentators perceive a
useful social message in drawing the dividing line between cessation
of treatment - when disease causes the ultimate death - and euthanasia - when a human act causes the patient's demise.37 Cases
rejecting a right of people to starve themselves to death in hunger
strikes have drawn just such a line.38 They distinguish between a
person's decision to starve and a dying person's rejection of lifesustaining treatment.3 9 Although we ultimately may come to regard the distinction between allowing and precipitating death as a
shallow psychological or symbolic anachronism,40 it surely deserves
more than the short-shrift consideration that Singer accords it.
Singer cannot fathom how society can permit active administration of possibly lethal outside
agents like analgesics while proscribing active euthanasia. See p. 188. Cf. Compassion in
Dying, 1996 WL 94848 (holding that a Washington statute prohibiting doctors from prescribing life-ending medication for the terminally ill who want to hasten their own deaths violates
due process).
The current legal authorization of analgesic administration, at first blush, does seem inconsistent with a ban on euthanasia. The customary explanation - that physicians administer analgesics with a primary intent to relieve pain - proves unpersuasive. Physicians might
commit euthanasia with the same primary intent. A better explanation lies in the difference
between the criminal law's authorization of some risky yet potentially beneficial acts and its
condemnation of probably lethal conduct undertaken for the same benevolent purposes. For
example, a surgeon may perform an operation for an important cosmetic benefit even though
the operation poses some modest risk of death to the patient, yet he cannot perform the same
operation if the mortal risk is very great. Along similar lines, a physician may administer an
analgesic that is necessary to relieve pain even though the act causes some risk of death. She
may not, however, administer a risky dosage when a smaller dosage would do, when alternative means to relieve the patient's pain exist, or when death probably will be caused. Thus,
the tension between the authorization of risky analgesics and the prohibition on euthanasia is
not as great as it appears. For a full account of the legalities of analgesic administration, see
George C. Thomas & Norman L. Cantor, Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal
Law, in 6 KENNEDY INST. OF ETiilcs J. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author).
37. See Daniel Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Jan.Feb. 1989, Special Supp. at 4, 5-6; Marion Doenhoff & Reinhard Merkel, Not Compassion
Alone: On Euthanasia and Ethics, trans. Hunter & Hildegard Hannum, HASTINGS Crn. REP.
Special Issue 1995, at 44; Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?,
HASTINGS CTR. REP. May-June 1993, at 32.
38. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 389 n.16 (Cal. 1993); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d
93, 97 (N.H. 1984); Van Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624-25 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982). But see Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (Ga. 1982).
39. See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (indicating in dictum that although a dying person might have a right to reject life-sustaining
medical intervention, a healthy person has no comparable right to starve himself to death).
40. The distinction certainly leads to some fine line drawing. A healthy person who engages in a hunger strike initiates an unnatural dying process and therefore is regarded as
committing suicide, but if a deteriorated, fatally stricken patient makes a deliberate decision
to stop eating, the strong medical and legal inclination is to acquiesce in the patient's fatal
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Even if Singer is right about the shaky moral basis of the traditional line between letting die and killing, his leap to the endorsement of active euthanasia seems premature. Practical concerns
cause many bioethicists to shy away from supporting the legalization of active euthanasia. While acknowledging that it may be morally justifiable to administer a poison to some suffering patients
who request it, they still oppose legalization of euthanasia because
of the perceived social hazards.4 1
Their apprehensions cover a wide range. They include fear of
outright abuse. For example, some bioethicists worry that slanted
presentations of the choices available will taint the patients' consent
received, or that society will use euthanasia to eliminate socially
isolated and unwanted individuals. Their apprehensions also include more subtle hazards supposedly flowing from the availability
of active euthanasia: pressure on fatally stricken patients to accept
death rather than undergo expensive life-sustaining therapy; diminution of medical efforts to palliate patients' suffering; weakening
of society's commitment to care for the dying; erosion of professional medical mores; erosion of health-care providers' morale; and
erosion of patient confidence in the medical profession fl.owing
from concern about physician-caused death. Although these
hazards may prove chimerical,42 Singer's book fails to address
them.
One might respond to these various concerns by arguing that
doctors rarely abuse their current role in withholding or withdrawing life support. Health-care providers have ample opportunity to
exploit gravely afflicted patients by manipulating informed consent
leading to life-support withdrawal decisions, by administering
analgesics with an incidental effect of accelerating death and by removing life support from incompetent patients. In short, similar
potential for abuse plagues both active euthanasia and withdrawal

course. Of course, this may indicate only that suicide is more understandable and tolerable
in some circumstances than in others.
41. See Joan Teno & Joanne Lynn, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Individual Case and
Public Policy, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoCY. 827 (1991). Some study commissions have taken
the position that the s9cial hazards of authorizing active euthanasia: outweigh the potential
benefits. See Crafting Public Policy on Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in NEw YoRK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS Soumrr: ASSIS"rED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 117-48 (1994); Extracts from the Report of the
House of Lords Select Committee of Medical Ethics, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note
33, at 96.
42. For a spirited defense of active euthanasia against these supposed dangers, see JAMES
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY (1986); Dan w. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CIR. REP. Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 14; Stephen Newman,
Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of • •. Time," 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 153 (1991).
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of life support, and yet abuse has not materialized in the latter
context.4 3
I find this only partially reassuring. As I explain in Part III, the
legal doctrine on the handling of incompetent dying patients and
the standards for surrogate decisionmaking still are evolving. While
medical professionals and surrogate decisionmakers have not perpetrated abuse on helpless patient populations, this fact may be attributable partially to the cautious evolution of legal standards for
life-support removal. Those standards are still in flux and still need
assessment.
Furthermore, advocates of active euthanasia cannot avoid the
difficulties associated with surrogate decisionmaking simply by insisting that we confine active euthanasia to competent patients.
Once we authorize active euthanasia, a natural impetus to extend
its "benefits" to incompetent persons will follow. If a competent
patient in unremitting pain would likely request and receive euthanasia, a strong impulse will emerge to extend the same benefit to an
incompetent patient in a similar condition who never provided or
never had the capability to provide advance instructions. Experience in the Netherlands confirms the existence of this impetus.44
Thus, proponents of active euthanasia ultimately must confront the
issue of the standards for surrogate decisionmaking, a topic that
Singer neglects except as to nonpersons.
III. THE

REAL ETHIC: AUTONOMY AND CONSTRUCTIVE
PREFERENCE

Part I showed that Singer's supposed "old ethic," which mandates the preservation of human life except by extraordinary
means, never prevailed. The real ethic of death and dying has developed in American jurisprudence over the past twenty years since
the 1976 Quinlan decision. Although some discontinuity between
legal doctrine and medical practice persists, that jurisprudence has
had a considerable impact on the professional standards applicable
to end-of-life care.
Both the relevant cases and statutes of the past twenty years
have tended to direct medical responses to fatal conditions according to patient preference, whether actual or putative. That
autonomy-oriented thrust seems most evident when competent patients make contemporaneous decisions about medical intervention
43. While many complaints are voiced about end-of-life medical practices, premature termination of life support is not one of them. See sources cited infra note 82.
44. Euthanasia has been performed there upon gravely incapacitated infants. See CAR·
LOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATII: EUTIIANASIA AND TIIE CASE OF TIIE NETIIERLANDS,
83-85 (1991}; Maurice A.M. deWachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, HASTINGS Crn. REP.
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 23, 24.
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or when they have left advance instructions for their post-competence care. Yet, even when the now-incompetent patient never prepared such instructions, what I call constructive preference - a
notion grounded in autonomy and respect for human dignity emerges as the principal legal guide to the patient's medical fate.
The construction of preference requires a decisionmaker to project
what the now-incompetent patient would want done. I call this approach constructive preference because it seeks to replicate a nowincompetent patient's likely preference in the absence of actual patient choice. The surrogate's decision inevitably must be constructive, but, as subsequent discussion will indicate, that decision need
not be disconnected from the patient's wishes.
An autonomy-constructive preference ethic does in fact underlie the current jurisprudence. Legal doctrine governing end-of-life
medical care starts with the competent patient. American courts
uniformly uphold the prerogative of competent patients to reject
life-sustaining medical intervention.45 In so doing, they look to the
doctrine of informed consent, a doctrine based on notions of bodily
integi;ity and self-determination that rest, in tum, on respect for
human dignity and capacity for choice.46 Thus, as to competent
medical patients, a close relation exists between autonomy and dignity. The primacy of autonomy extends to "prospective autonomy"
- a competent person's right to shape her post-competence medical treatment by advance instructions. Numerous cases have
looked to such instructions as the key determinant in surrogate
decisionmaking.47
Legislatures also respect prospective autonomy. All fifty states
accord statutory protection for som~ form of advance medical directive. 48 Living will and advance directive laws, for example, give
legal effect to the advance instructions of now-incompetent patients.49 Durable-power-of-attorney laws allow people to designate
45. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
McAffee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
46. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 142-46; GERALD DWORKIN, THE
THEORY AND PRAcnCE OF AUTONOMY (1988) .
.47.. Some cases see prospective autonomy as grounded in the competent patient's constitutional right to reject medical intervention. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586
(D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). Other cases uphold
prospective autonomy as an extension of a patient's common-law prerogative to make personal medical decisions. See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853 n.20 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989); In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951-52 (Me. 1987).
48. See SOCIETY FOR TiiE RIGHI" TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION: A
STATE BY STATE CoMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES (1991).
49. See David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 Mo. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59
(1994).
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health-care agents to implement their advance instructions.50 The
apparent object of these legal sources - both judicial and legislative - is to respect self-determination in shaping one's own dying
process.51
Some commentators challenge the notion of prospective autonomy.52 They question the validity of choices made well in advance
of incapacity and perhaps without a full understanding of and deliberation over the range of possible medical conditions and outcomes:
They also contend that the interests that shape a declarant's advance instructions - in avoiding indignity, in avoiding the frustration of helplessness and debilitation, and in sparing loved ones from
emotional and financial burdens - become largely irrelevant once
incompetent patients no longer can appreciate violations of their
prior choices.
·
Nonetheless, the overwhelming weight of judicial and legislative
sentiment endorses prospective autonomy. The explanation is simple and understandable. People have a strong interest in shaping
their own version of a dignified dying process regardless of whether
they actually experience the feared degradation. Many adults have
witnessed the demise of a loved one and can envision a level of
debilitation that they deem intolerably undignified. People care
about their lifetime image, which includes the memories left behind
during the dying process.53 They wish to imprint their values whether grounded in religion, a personal vision of dignity, or solicitude toward loved ones - on their end-of-life story. Prospective
autonomy therefore protects important interests in self-definition
and self-determination.s4
Even if prospective autonomy is a meaningful concept, what
about the incompetent person who never articulated her choices?
Her surrogate's decision cannot invoke genuine autonomy - genu50. Id. at 1259-60.
51. "The principle of respect for persons, which supports respect for the autonomous
patient's choices, also supports reliance on the nonautonomous person's prior autonomous
directives." James F. Childress, Dying Patients: Who's in Control?, 11 LAw MED. & HEALTII
CARE 227, 228 (1989).
52. See Dan W. Brock, Trumping Advance Directives, HASTINGS Cra. REP. Sept.-Oct.
1991, Special Supp., at SS; Rebecca S. Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 609 (1994); Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson,
Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the
Orthodox Approach, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTII CARE 234, 236-38 (1989); John A. Robertson,
Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25
GA. L. REV. 1139, 1159, 1180-81 (1991).
53. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343-44, 356 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 201-17 (1993); Harris, supra
note 23, at 6, 14.
54. For a more elaborate defense of prospective autonomy and discussion of its bounds,
see NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIREcnVES AND TIIE PURSUIT OF DEATII WITII
DIGNITY 23-32, 122-34 (1993).
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ine autonomy demands a personalized weighing of medical options
in light of personal values and preferences.ss Nonetheless, the applicable legal norms in this context recognize a close relation between patient choice and surrogate decisionmaking. Both of the
common standards governing decisionmaking on behalf of formerly
competent patients - "substituted judgment" and "best interests"
- display strong preoccupation with the patient's putative desires
even when she never prepared advance instructions.
The substituted-judgment standard seeks to reach the same decision that the patient would reach if competent and cognizant of
the circumstances. That objective - seeking to project and replicate what the patient would want - reflects the law's pervasive
interest in respecting personal choice. Actual patient choice is impossible in the absence of prior instructions; however, the substituted-judgment approach serves the patient-choice goal by
examining the patient's personal value system, including her "philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way [life] should be lived, and attitudes toward
... suffering and death."S 6 Some versions of substituted judgment
authorize a surrogate decisionmaker to use such data in order to
make a best approximation of what the patient would want, if
competent.s7
The substituted-judgment standard thus seeks to treat the formerly competent patient as an individual with moral dignity whose
putative preferences matter.ss By allowing a surrogate to consider
a range of possible dispositions, from vigorous medical intervention
to merely palliative care, it preserves the same range of options that
would be available to a competent patient. In so doing, the substituted-judgment approach underlines the equivalence in stature between the now-incompetent person and her former competent self.
Also, by striving to discern her likely wishes, the formula seeks to
preserve the autonomy rights that the formerly competent patient
no longer can exercise.s9
55. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985).
56. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (III. 1989).
57. See Matter of Tave!, 661A.2d1061, 1068-69 (Del. 1995); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at
299-300; Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626, 631-32 (Mass. 1986); In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (Wash. 1987); In re
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
58. See John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgement Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 63 (1976).
59. Notice how two of the earliest decisions involving incompetent patients stressed the
goal of preserving a competent patient's right to choose: "The only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right [to reject treatment] is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to
render their best judgment ... as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances."
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Saikewicz court
noted:
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The problem with the substituted-judgment standard lies in its
administration, especially in the absence of prior, considered instructions. Reliance on value-related or character-related data
about the patient may engender uncertainty about what the patient
would have wanted, if competent. To be sure, certain personal values may provide conclusive evidence of the patient's preferences.
For example, a surrogate for a devout orthodox Jew or Roman
Catholic who always has subscribed to her denomination's religious
precepts safely can ascribe that denomination's well-developed positions regarding terminal care to the patient. Many factors commonly invoked to guide a surrogate under the substituted-judgment
standard, however - such as the patient's prior attitude toward
doctors, general lifestyle, and solicitude for the interests of close
family - simply cannot identify the point of decline at which the
patient would prefer death to continued existence.60 Reliance on a
patient's general value system, as part of a "best approximation"
method for determining the patient's wishes, has prompted substantial criticism. The critics point to studies that indicate that a significant discrepancy exists between the wishes of seriously ill patients
and the beliefs of their relatives as to what the patients would
want.61 At best, these data suggest that some disjunction may lie
between the surrogate's definition of the patient's wishes and the
patient's actual, though unexpressed, wishes. At worst, they indicate that general value system or lifestyle indicia of patients' wishes
leave room for surrogates to impose their own values and predispositions on patients. 62 The ultimate specter is that surrogates, under
the guise of the putative wishes of the patient, will make biased or
self-interested determinations.
We think that principles of equality and respect for all Individuals require the conclusion
that a choice exists...• [W]e recognize a general right in all persons to refuse medical
treatment in appropriate circumstances. The recognition of that right must extend to the
case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human
dignity extends to both.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977).
60. See Bernard Lo, Caring for Incompetent Patients: Is There a Physician on the Case?,
17 LAw MED. & HEALTII CARE 214, 215-17 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 390-91 (1988).
61. See Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Decisions at the End of Life: Guided by
Communities of Patients, HASTINGS Crn. REP. Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 6-7; Jeremiah Suh! et al.,

Myth of Substituted Judgement: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Support is Unreliable, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEo. 93-94 (1994); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians'
and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY
115, 120 (1988); Nancy Zweibel & Christine Cassell, Treatment Choices at the End of Life, 29
GERONTOLOGIST 615, 618 (1989). See also sources cited in Kathryn A. Koch et al., Analysis
of Power in Medical Decision-Making: An Argument for Physician Autonomy, 20 LAW MED.
& HEALTII CARE 320, 323 n.11 (1992).

62. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 52, at 235; Lo, supra note 60, at 216; Tracy L.
Merritt, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 689, 709, 714 (1987); Rhoden,
supra note 60, at 387.
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The solution, however, is not to abandon the substitutedjudgment standard's focus on putative patient wishes. Rather, it is
to guard against excessive surrogate subjectivity by formulating default norms to guide and circumscribe surrogate decisionmaking.63
Beside substituted judgment, the other major standard for surrogate decisionmakers is the "best interests of the patient." 64
Under one version of best interests, the surrogate seeks to assess
the objective well-being of the now-incompetent patient and maintains life support unless the prospective burdens· on the patient primarily pain and suffering - appear to outweigh the benefits pleasure and satisfaction.65 A best-interests formula, however, can
and usually does encompass more than just the observable emotions of the patient.
In its own fashion, a best-interests standard impels the surrogate
to effectuate what the now-incompetent patient would have
wanted, if competent. In the absence of proof about the patient's
actual wishes, the best-interests standard assumes that the patient
would want the same treatment that the average person in the same
circumstances would want. It defines patient well-being - the key
to best interests - according to understandings about the average
person's definition of well-being.66 Extreme suffering, for example,
is regarded as an integral ingredient of best interests because the
vast majority of people are averse to extreme suffering. Quality of
life, often addressed under the rubric of patient dignity, frequently
forms an element of best interests because the average person ties
the two together.67 The hope is to implement the patient's likely
63. For elaboration on this idea, see infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
64. Many view the two standards - substituted judgment and best interests - as part of
a continuum. The surrogate starts with substituted judgment and seeks to ascertain what the
patient would have wanted by considering prior expressions and other indicia. When those
indicia prove indeterminative, the surrogate attempts to define the best interests of the patient. See Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan
to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 891, 922-23 (1989); Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions:
Who Makes Them and By What Standards, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 518-22 (1989); Robert
M. Veatch, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Limits to the Consensus, 3 KENNEDY INST.
OF ETHICS J. 1 (1993).
65. See Dresser, supra note 52, at 657 n.2, 711; Rhoden, supra note 60, at 398-99.
66. See NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAw, WHEN Onnms MusT
CHOOSE 55-56 (1992); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 136 (1983). Dan W. Brock contends that best interests "amounts to asking how
most reasonable persons would decide jn these circumstances." Dan W. Brock, Surrogate
Decision Making for Incompetent Adults: An Ethical Framework, 58 MouNT SINAI J. MED.
388 (1991).
67. See NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 41, at 77-113 (arguing that life support seems excessively burdensome for a "patient who would have viewed continued treatment as an affront to his or her dignity"); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1,
at 219. Clinical protocols - guidelines for end-of-life care prepared by professional organizations - often include quality of life as an element of best interests. See AM. MEDICAL
ASSN., CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, § 2.16;
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choice by having the surrogate use the same criteria and weighting
of factors that most people would choose for themselves. 68 The
best-interests and substituted-judgment approaches thus have a
common objective - replication of what the individual patient
likely would want regarding end-of-life care.69
While the best-interests and substituted-judgment formulae
share a common ethic, they also share common difficulties. Both
raise the same kinds of concerns - indeterminacy and potential
subjectivity in surrogate decisionmaking. For example, to the extent that the best-interests standard considers suffering as a key element, discerning the experiential reality of gravely demented
patients seems a daunting, if not impossible, task.70 Indeed, severe
problems of measurement plague any surrogate seeking to determine an incompetent's level of suffering or to compare her levels of
suffering and satisfaction. Likewise, imprecision nags at any
quality-of-life determination as an ingredient of best interests.
. Some commentators dismiss quality of life - or indignity - as a
subjective, value-laden notion that lacks consistency and falls prey
to surrogates' biases regarding a minimally tolerable quality of
1!-1' 71
llJ.e.

In sum, the jurisprudence of surrogate decisionmaking strives to
implement the actual or putative wishes of incompetent patients.
Yet if we really want to implement those wishes, we must overcome
Los ANGELES CouNTY MEDICAL AssN. & Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR AssN. Jo1NT CoMMITI"EE ON BIOMEDICAL ETiiICS, FORGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT FOR ADULT
PATIENTS: PATIENTS WITHOUT DECISION MAKING CAPACITY WHO LACK SURROGATES 3
(1993); John M. Stanley et al., The Appleton Consensus: Suggested International Guidelines
for Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment, 15 J. MED. ETiiics 129, 131 {1989).
68. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 28 {1987).
69. The two standards do not ignore the actual preferences of the particular patient. The
substituted-judgment standard examines them before turning to a best-interests approach,
and the best-interests formula often consults the patient's discernible values and preferences
in defining her best interests.
70. "The real burdens and benefits of life in extremely debilitating circumstances are
often beyond our ability to know confidently or comprehend fully." Peters, supra note 64, at
942. For a comprehensive examination of this issue, and one urging greater efforts to discern
the murky reality in question, see Dresser, supra note 52, at 666-91. Beside Professor
Dresser, many other commentators have noted the intrinsic difficulty in measuring the burdens and benefits of a severely demented patient. See John Arras, The Severely Demented,
Minimally Functional Patient: An Ethical Analysis, 36 J. AM. GERIATRIC Socv. 938 {1988);
Rhoden, supra note 60, at 404-05; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C.
L. REV. 845, 847-50 {1990); see also In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 424-25 (N.J. 1987).
71. See Lo, supra note 60, at 216-17; D. Don Welch, Walking in Their Shoes: Paying
Respect to Incompetent Patients, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1617, 1636-37 {1989); Developments in the
Law - Medical Technology and the Law, Section IV: The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1652-53 {1990); cf. Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional
"Right to Die"? When is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1241
{1991) (recognizing the subjective biases involved in decisions to terminate life-sustaining
treatment).
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the imprecision and subjectivity inherent in concepts such as intolerable indignity or quality of life.72 This is essential because any
effective surrogate decisionmaking standard must reassure competent persons that their post-competence care will conform to their
desires and expectations. Unless we achieve a common understanding of intolerable indignity, for example, a decisionmaking
standard that incorporates that element will engender anxiety
rather than reassurance. We need, therefore, reliable guidelines
about levels of intolerable indignity to serve as a check on arbitrariness and abuse in surrogate decisionmaking.
I use the term "constructive preference" to denote an approach
that surrogates may employ when making end-of-life medical decisions for formerly competent patients who left no instructions.73
The object - as with much of substituted-judgment and bestinterests doctrine - is to provide the medical care that the nowincompetent patient would have chosen if she had considered the
issue while competent. Because the patient never exercised her
prospective autonomy prerogative or provided definitive guidance
with regard to her end-of-life treatment, the surrogate will do her
best to determine what most people would want in the same circumstances and to treat the patient acc.ordingly.74 As Nancy
Rhoden argues, acting on a patient's "probable desires can be
equated with implementing the patient's right of choice. "75
Constructive preference rests on the premise that most people
want to avoid extreme indignity in their own post-competence dying processes. Constructive preference also assumes that widespread accord exists about intolerable levels of debilitation in the
dying process, and that this accord will allow for some default
72. Sanford H. Kadish comments:
How much ability to sense and take comfort from experiences is required before we can
say [a debilitated patient's] life is not worth living? At bottom, the difficulty is that we
have no way to make confident judgments about how far cognitive and physical deterioration must go before life ceases to be worth living, because the value judgments implicit
in such a conclusion are in sharp contention in our society.
Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857,
882 (1992).
Rebecca S. Dresser also cites the "highly disparate meanings" dignity can have for different people. Rebecca S. Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 Aruz. L. REv. 373, 387 (1986).
73. I engage in a much longer and more detailed discussion of constructive preference in
Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author).
74. Under the prevailing autonomy ethic, a patient's actual preferences, when discernible, should govern. Therefore, constructive preference provides a fallback when a patient's
history and values provide no definitive guidance to her surrogate.
75. Rhoden, supra note 60, at 384.
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guides.76 Of course, the array of circumstances that confront dying
patients is enormous and not every patient's situation can be resolved by resort to widespread accord or consensus. At least for
some commonly confronted circumstances, though, surrogates may
find guidance in people's widely shared predilections about intolerable levels of debilitation.
Permanent unconsciousness provides the best example of consensus sufficient to trigger constructive preference. Surveys consistently show that the vast majority of people would not wish to have
life support to maintain them in a permanently unconscious state.77
Given this, a surrogate should be required to authorize the cessation of life support for a permanently unconscious patient absent
significant evidence that the patient's views deviate from the common preference.78
The constructive-preference approach raises many issues: How
can we measure common preferences about indignity, given the
multitude of potential death-and-dying circumstances? Whose
preferences should matter in establishing a norm? What impact
upon a surrogate's choice should fl.ow from the fact that x or y percentage of people deem a particular status intolerably undignified
for their own future fates?
I address only the first question here. As to data sources, people's preferences regarding post-competence medical care can be
gleaned from surveys and from bulk analysis of advance medical
directives.79 While some advance directives seem cursory and uninformative, others spell out clear visions of intolerable indignity in
the dying process.80 Also, although surveys cannot anticipate the
76. Several commentators recognize the need for default positions, grounded on understandings about what most people would want for themselves, to guide decisions on behalf of
incompetent patients who have not left sufficient indicia of their personal preferences. See
James F. Drane & John L. Coulehan, The Best-Interest Standard: Surrogate Decision Making
and Quality of Life, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 20, 24-26, 29 (1995); James Lindgren, Death by
Default, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 1993, at 185, 186, 195, 199, 228-29; Carl E. Schneider,
From Consumer Choice to Consumer Welfare, HASTINGS Cm. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special
Supp., at S25, S27 (urging default positions for patients based on "what we think they would
want if they thought about it").
77. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 76, at 231.
78. Other commentators favor this kind of a presumption in the case of permanently
unconscious patients. See Marcia Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1524 (1994); Michele Yeun, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting
New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 623 (1992); Schrode,
supra note 26; Bernard D. Davis, Right to Die: Living Wills are Inadequate, WALL ST. J., July
31, 1990, at A12.
79. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 61, at 6; Lindgren, supra note 76.
80. See Norman L. Cantor, My Annotated Living Will, 18 LAw MED. & HEALTII CARE
114 (1990). Some advance directives utilize values histories or values profiles to provide
guidance about intolerable levels of debilitation. See CANTOR, supra note 54, at 166-70;
Ezekiel Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Living Wills: Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. CLIN.
ETHICS 9, 15-16 (1990); Linda L. Emanuel, Structured Deliberation to Improve Decisionmaking for the Seriously Ill, HASTINGS Cm. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special Supp., at S14; Pam
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multitude of circumstances that will confront incompetent patients,
they can utilize scenarios that reflect a range of commonly occurring conditions in the dying process.81
Constructive preference assumes, in the end, that default presumptions can be anchored in objectively measurable data about
the level of mental and physical debilitation that most people consider intolerably undignified and therefore unacceptable. It assumes that we can establish guidelines or presumptions for certain
commonly occurring conditions. When a large majority of people
would prefer withdrawal of life support, a surrogate should implement the popular preference and withdraw life support, unless significant indicia in the particular patient's history indicate that the
patient would prefer otherwise. Default principles would have to
receive wide publicity, so that any person whose preferences differed from the default position could issue advance instructions and
avoid imposition of constructive preference. By focusing on what
competent people commonly choose and reject, constructive preference discourages resort to surrogates' subjective visions about
which lives are worth preserving or to any government-formulated
view of minimally acceptable dignity. Moreover, by following a
course that the majority of people would choose -·that is, implementing the course that the now-incompetent patient would likely
have chosen - constructive preference comes as close as possible
to fulfilling the wishes of people who have never communicated
their wishes or left other meaningful indicia of their preferences for
end-of-life medical intervention.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to what Singer suggests, an ethic already exists in the
context of death-and-dying that does not adopt a maximum extension-of-life principle. The, ethic that permeates the past twenty
years of jurisprudence places primacy on autonomy - both contemporaneous and prospective - and on constructive preference
when a patient's actual preference cannot be determined. The contemporary ethic recognizes quality-of-life distinctions that are
grounded in competent persons' choices regarding intolerable inLambert et al., The Values History: An Innovation in Surrogate Medical Decision-Making, 18
LAW MED. & HEALTii CARE 202 (1990); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Relationship of
General Advance Directive Instructions to Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences, 152
ARCHIVES INT. MED. 2114, 2117-18 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care - A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (1991); Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel Emanuel, The
Medical Directive, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989); Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 61, at 6. Both
scenarios and values profiles - documents asking people to identify elements of personally
intolerable indignity - will permit us to learn about common attitudes toward end-of-life

care.
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dignity in the dying process or in surrogates' choices based on understandings of what most people would wish in similar
circumstances. The challenge is not, as Singer claims, to propound
a radically new ethic - although he may be right that active euthanasia ultimately will be added as an available option. Rather, the
challenge is to translate the extant theory into practice. For in
American institutions the sad reality continues to be that the dying
process often is not what patients want - or would have wanted.82

82. A large recent study seems to indicate that the dying process in many hospitals still is
characterized by absence of communication between patients or surrogates and caregivers,
misunderstanding about the wishes of the patient, and over-commitment to aggressive intervention. See The Study to Understand Prognosis and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of
Treatment (SUPPORT), A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized
Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995). For reactions to this study and suggestions about how to
conform customary practice to ethical theory, see Bernard Lo, Improving Care Near the End
of Life: Why ls It So Hard?, 274 JAMA 1634 (1995); Dying Well in the Hospital: The Lessons of SUPPORT, HASTINGS Crn. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special Supp., at Sl-S36.

